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Abstract 
 
Purpose: Although the threat of terrorist attacks is not a new phenomenon for hotels, 
limited literature exists on measures that hotels can take to prevent them or limit their 
damage. The purpose of this paper is to propose a baseline strategy to address this threat. 
 
Design/methodology/approach: Using the terrorist attack cycle and the security function 
models introduced in this paper, nineteen hotel security experts, members of an 
international working group on terrorism, were tasked to reach consensus on a baseline 
anti-terrorist strategy for a hotel. To reach this consensus, the study employed the 
Nominal Group Technique. 
 
Findings: The study presents a six-step baseline anti-terrorism strategy and a series of 
measures and actions under each step. In the centre of this strategy lies the disruption of 
the terrorist attack cycle.  
 
Research limitations/implications: There are limitations inherent to the Nominal Group 
Technique which may not allow the generalisability of the findings. However, every 
effort was made to ensure the reliability and validity of the study. 
 
Practical implications: The study suggests a shift from physical protection alone to a 
more intelligence-led approach. Counter-surveillance, terrorist behavioral analysis, higher 
visibility of security measures, stronger relationships with local community leaders, 
collaborative relationships with emergency response agencies and strategic use of risk 
intelligence providers will have to take a higher place in the agendas of hotel security 
departments. 
 
Originality/value: The paper presents for the first time two models that industry 
practitioners will find useful when designing security policies: the terrorist attack cycle 
and the security function model. Each component of the proposed strategy provides a 
 1 
starting point for the design of security strategies tailored on the security needs and 
budget of any hotel property. 
 
 
Key words: Terrorism; Terrorist Attack Cycle; Hotel Security Function; Physical 
Protection; Counter-surveillance; Intelligence-led Security. 
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Aligning Strategy to Threat:  
A Baseline Anti-Terrorism Strategy for Hotels 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the last decade the hotel industry has witnessed a series of terrorist attacks with 
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs – car bombs, such as in the 2003 
JW Marriott bombing in Jakarta, Indonesia or the 2004 attack in Taba Hilton, Sinai 
peninsula), suicide bombers (e.g., the 2005 triple bombing of the Grand Hyatt, the 
Radisson SAS and the Days Inn in Amman, Jordan and the double bombing of the JW 
Marriott and the Ritz Carlton in Jakarta, Indonesia in 2009) and storming assaults (the 
2008 Taj and Oberoi hotel attacks in Mumbai, India, the 2011 Intercontinental attack in 
Kabul, Afghanistan). 
 
In response to such attacks, many hotels introduced both physical and technical measures 
that control the free flow of people and vehicles to hotel areas (stand-off zones, drop-arm 
barriers and bollards, metal and explosive vapor detectors, etc). In many cases however 
(e.g., the 2008 Islamabad Marriott attack in Pakistan and the 2009 double Jakarta 
bombings) these measures did not manage to provide a high level of protection to hotels.  
Further ‘hardening’ of hotels with armed security personnel has not been a deterrent for 
terrorists as evidenced in attacks such as those on the Serena Hotel in Kabul, Afghanistan 
(in 2007, 2008 and 2010) or on the Pearl Continental in Peshawar, Pakistan in 2009.  
 
Looking back in history, physical protection measures alone were never able to avert a 
terrorist attack to a hotel. The very first hotel bombing in history was carried out in 22 
July 1946 on the King David Hotel in Jerusalem by the Irgun, a militant Jewish 
underground organization of the time (Martin, 2009). The hotel was hosting the 
Headquarters of the British Mandatory authorities of Palestine, the Secretariat of the 
Government of Palestine and the Headquarters of the British Forces in Palestine and 
Transjordan and although there are no formal records about the security in place at the 
time, there is no doubt that such a location would be well protected. The Irgun bomb 
attack caused the collapse of the hotel’s southern wing which housed the Mandate's 
intelligence records about Irgun, the Hagana, Lehi, and other Jewish paramilitary groups. 
With a death toll of 91, this hotel attack is considered one of the bloodiest but also most 
successful (in terms of outcomes for the terrorists) attacks in the history and provided a 
model for further attacks towards the end of the 20th century (Enders and Sandler, 2006; 
Martin, 2009). Another example of a hotel targeted in spite of its physical protection 
measures is the Hotel Europa in Belfast which is characterized as the “world's most 
bombed hotel” with 33 bombings by the Provisional IRA in the period between 1972 and 
1994 (Wylie, 2001). It appears therefore that, regardless of whether they are ‘soft’ or 
‘hardened’ targets, hotels need to go beyond current practices and take a more strategic 
approach in their security planning in order to respond more effectively to the threat of 
terrorism.  
 
 3 
The importance of terrorism in hospitality and tourism is reflected in a significant body of 
literature dedicated to the study of this phenomenon. However, the largest part of this 
literature either takes a case study approach and analyses the attacks and their impacts 
(e.g., Araña and León 2008; Drakos and Kutan, 2003; Henderson, 2003; O’Connor et al., 
2008; Pizam and Smith, 2000; Sönmez et al., 1999; Yechiam et al., 2005) or looks at 
marketing recovery efforts of destinations attacked by terrorists (Beirman, 2002; Blake 
and Sinclair, 2003; Gurtner, 2007; Israeli and Reichel, 2003; Pratt, 2002; Rittichainuwat 
and  Chakraborty, 2009; Stafford et al., 2002).  
 
The research on a strategic approach to address the terrorism threat, however, is quite 
limited (Paraskevas, 2008; Paraskevas and Arendell, 2007) and this paper aims at 
narrowing this gap first by drawing from the terrorism literature a model for the ‘terrorist 
attack cycle’ (TAC) and from the extant crisis management and generic security literature 
a model for the security function per se. Then, it uses these models with a group of 
nineteen hotel security experts and the nominal group technique (NGT) to develop and 
propose a baseline anti-terrorism strategy for hotels.       
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1. Terrorism and Terrorist Motivations 
 
There are so many competing (though sometimes partially overlapping) definitions for 
terrorism (Schmid and Jongman, 1988) that Gearty (1996, p. xi) argued that the 
phenomenon is “shrouded by terminological confusion”. Several scholars have attempted 
to identify the defining criteria for terrorism (e.g., Gupta, Horgan and Schmid, 2009; 
Martin, 2009; Ruby 2002) which are broadly agreed to be: premeditated use of illegal and 
often extraordinary and unconventional force; action triggered by political or other 
ideological motives; attacks directed towards non-combatants (soft civilian and passive 
military targets); actors are sub-national groups or clandestine agents; acts aimed at 
purposefully affecting (creating of a fearful state of mind) an intended audience (much 
wider than the immediate victims). English (2009, p. 24) offers a comprehensive 
definition of the term: 
 
Terrorism involves heterogeneous violence used or threatened with a political aim; it can involve a 
variety of acts, of targets, and of actors; it possesses an important psychological dimension, 
producing terror or fear among a directly threatened group and also a wider implied audience in 
the hope of maximizing political communication and achievement; it embodies the exerting and 
implementing of power, and the attempted redressing of power relations; it represents a subspecies 
of warfare, and as such it can form part of a wider campaign of violent and non-violent attempts at 
political leverage.  
 
Hotels are broadly considered as ‘soft’ targets, i.e., targets that are difficult to protect and 
easy to penetrate and, by their business, social and symbolic nature, lend themselves as 
primary means to achieve the terrorists’ objectives listed in the definition above. 
Hennelly (2008) notes that the continuous flow of people in and out of a hotel poses a 
challenge for its protection from a terrorist attack. Carlisle (2007) comments on how 
Dihren Barot was not challenged at all in carrying out surveillance and reconnaissance in 
top London hotels such as the Berkeley, the Savoy, the Hyatt Carlton Tower, the Marble 
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Arch Marriott and the Park Lane Intercontinental.  Pizam (2010, p. 1) on the other hand, 
argues that hotels provide the terrorists with an “exceptional opportunity to carry out their 
heinous acts”. He states three main reasons: they are not properly guarded for the fear of 
alienating the guests; the media will disseminate the terrorists’ message worldwide, “loud, 
clear and fast”; and due to their nature of hosting “foreign devils”, they offer a 
‘‘legitimate’’ justification for the attack. Richter and Waugh (1986) emphasize that the 
symbolic values of wealth, freedom of choice, independence and everything that is 
associated with Western consumption and corruption make hotels primary targets for a 
terrorist group.   
 
Even when attacks seem irrational to the wider public, one needs to remember that 
terrorists always act as ‘rational actors’ and political utility maxi misers constantly 
weighing cost and benefits for each attack (Fussey 2011; McCormick, 2003). Although 
every terrorist attack has a specific political aim and carries a message, the terrorists 
carrying the attack may be motivated by their own personal agendas. These may stem 
from completely different political, religious and psychosocial experiences such as 
strongly perceived oppression, humiliation or persecution, an extraordinary need for 
collective vengeance or a drive for expression of intrinsic aggressiveness (Victoroff, 
2005). Goertzel (2002) argues that terrorists often rationalize their atrocities on moral 
ground as they believe that their actions are defensive; they are saving themselves from 
the great evil and they are compelled to commit their violence. In the 2005 triple hotel 
bombing in Amman resulting in the death of 57 Muslims, for example, Al Qaeda justified 
the attack by stating that they had “struck only after becoming confident that these hotels 
are centers for launching war on Islam and supporting the Crusaders’ presence in Iraq and 
the Arab peninsula and the presence of the Jews on the land of Palestine” (Fox News, 
2005).  
 
 
2.2. The Terrorist Attack Cycle 
 
In accordance with the concepts of ‘rational action’ (Fussey, 2011; McCormick, 2003) 
and ‘warfare’ (English, 2009), all terrorist attacks follow to some extent the same pattern 
of activities, known as the “terrorist attack cycle”. STRATFOR (2005) suggests six 
distinct stages: target selection, planning, deployment, attack, escape and media 
exploitation, whereas the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (U.S. DHS, 2009) 
proposes a similar cycle with seven stages. For the purposes of this study, these cycles 
were adapted to the one presented in Fig. 1, which consists of eight different stages. It 
was felt that the proposed distinction of the various stages would further facilitate the 
identification of terrorists’ vulnerabilities in the attack cycle and the development of 
appropriate interventions in the security function. 
 
Preliminary selection of alternative targets. This is the first stage of the attack cycle and 
normally depends on the terrorist group’s objectives (target’s symbolic value, target that 
will create greater media attention or on which the attack will cause the maximum 
possible damage, etc.) and its operational capabilities.  
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Fig. 1 - The Terrorist Attack Cycle 
 
 
 
Intelligence activities. The terrorists undertake a set of activities aiming at the evaluation 
of the selected targets by collecting information through basic research, surveillance and 
reconnaissance.  
 
Final target selection. The intelligence generated in the previous stage is used to evaluate 
the various targets against criteria such as: resources and capabilities necessary to carry 
out the attack on a particular target; expected attack impact; target symbolism; and, 
finally, the number and demographics of targeted population (Weaver et al., 2001).  
 
Operational planning. Once the decision on the target is made, the method and timing of 
attack, the equipment, the personnel and the training required to carry it out are decided 
upon. This stage also includes the funding, the management of supply chain and the 
logistics of the operation 
 
Dry-runs. Before the execution of the final operation, plans may be ‘rehearsed’ in 
simulated conditions by the operatives in order to identify potential planning flaws and 
unanticipated problems and verify that the assumptions made during the operational 
planning have not changed (Fussey, 2011).  
 
Asset deployment. In this stage the group’s logistics unit will prepare and place all 
required supplies at or near the target, the operatives will leave their safe houses, 
assemble teams and weapons and prepare the attack.  
 
Attack. This is when the operational plan is carried out. Once it is set in motion, it is 
difficult to be averted, since the attackers have the advantage of surprise and with the 
intelligence available will have planned for and neutralized any measures.  
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Closure / Media Exploitation. The closure of the operation will depend on whether an 
escape is planned at tactical level for the operatives or if the mission is a suicide attack. 
Since media exploitation and ideological statements are primary objectives in any 
operation, the group will have a plan to communicate its messages to the intended publics 
(adversaries and supporters). 
 
Given this cycle, national counter-terrorism forces, intelligence and security services are 
looking for gaps and vulnerabilities in it and aim to disrupt it, interdict the attack and 
eventually apprehend the terrorists. The target’s security function plays an important role 
here, since it is exposed to the terrorists’ activities from the beginning of the attack cycle 
and may have many opportunities to detect their intentions and disrupt these activities 
from an early stage.  
 
 
2.3. Terrorism, Crisis Management and the Security Function 
 
In the crisis management literature, terrorism has been classified as a type of ‘man-made 
crisis’ (Mitroff, 2005). A terrorist attack can be considered as a crisis, i.e., a “low-
probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organization and is 
characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a 
belief that decisions must be made swiftly” (Pearson and Clair, 1998, p. 60). Crisis 
management thinking can therefore be a useful conceptual framework in dealing with the 
terrorist threat.  
 
One model of crisis management which is perhaps the most cited in the literature is the 
‘PPRR model’. This model has its origins in the disaster management field and consists 
of four phases: Prevention; Preparedness; Response; and Recovery also known as 
“Comprehensive Emergency Management” model (Drabek, 1985; Perry, 1985). In some 
versions of the model (e.g., McLoughlin, 1985; Tierney, 1989; Coppola, 2006), the 
Prevention phase is replaced with Mitigation (MPRR), although without a significant 
change in meaning. This model has its roots in the field of preventive psychiatry, namely 
the work of Caplan, who described three levels of “crisis intervention” (Caplan, 1964, pp. 
16-17): 
 
1. Primary Intervention, which consists of activities that are directed at ‘reducing 
incidence’, i.e., aim at preventing a crisis from occurring (and would correspond to 
‘prevention’ in the PPRR model); 
 
2. Secondary Intervention aims at ‘reducing prevalence by shortening the duration of the 
crisis’, i.e., consists of the actions taken once the crisis manifests itself in order to 
minimize its adverse impact and contain it as much as possible at a manageable level 
(this would correspond to the ‘response’ element in PPRR); and, 
 
3. Tertiary Intervention, which involves actions ‘reducing severity and disability’, i.e., 
activities providing long-term follow-up help to those affected by the crisis (this would 
correspond to ‘recovery’ in PPRR). 
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An improved version of the PPRR is also recommended by Mitroff in several of his 
studies over time (e.g., Shrivastava and Mitroff, 1987; Pearson and Mitroff, 1993, Mitroff, 
2004).  More specifically, building on earlier work (Mitroff, 1988), he suggested a model 
in which he distinguished six phases in crisis management: signal detection; 
preparation/prevention; containment (damage limitation); business recovery; no-fault 
learning and redesign (Mitroff, 2005:210).  
 
These crisis management models have set a foundation for the development of the 
security function as the organization’s principal line of protection and assurance against 
internal and external threats (Schweitzer, 1987). These threats may range from fraud, 
theft and malfeasance to money laundering, employee conduct, and response to major 
events including natural and man-made disasters (Broder, 2006). Regardless of the 
threats that the security function is protecting an organization from, the approach to 
protection largely follows the same system design, known also as the ‘Sandia 
Methodology’ (Danneels, 2000).  This methodology was originally developed by Sandia 
National Laboratories in order to design a physical protection system for nuclear power 
plants. The Sandia Methodology emphasizes three security function components: ‘detect’, 
‘delay’ and ‘respond’ which have clear links with the PPRR and Mitroff’s (2005) model 
of crisis management.  
 
The phases labeled ‘Signal Detection’ and ‘Preparation/Prevention’ in Mitroff’s model 
constitute the proactive approach to crisis management and determine the readiness of the 
organization to deal with a crisis. Shaeffer and Mano-Negrin (2003) argue that these 
phases enable the organization “to foresee and effectively address internal or exogenous 
adversary circumstances with the potential to inflict a multidimensional crisis, by 
consciously recognizing and proactively preparing for its inevitable occurrence” (p. 575). 
In the signal detection phase, crisis management activities focus on seeking signals that 
might warn of a crisis, and isolate these from other more normal signals that occur in the 
daily operations of organizations. With appropriate signal detection mechanisms in place, 
crisis signals can be picked up in time and then, some -if not all- crises can be averted 
before they happen. The detect component of Sandia’s security model refers to the 
discovery of an adversary’s overt or covert action. It involves a sensing mechanism 
which reacts to a stimulus and initiates an alarm. The information from the sensor is 
evaluated by a security person and the alarm is judged as valid or invalid.  
 
Early detection of warning signals will help the organization take the appropriate 
measures in the prevention/preparation phase. In this second stage, Mitroff considered 
preparation and prevention as one set of activities rather than two separate as advocated 
by the PPRR model. In his view, organizations can be either “crisis prone” or “crisis 
prepared” (Mitroff, 2005). However, Sandia’s model does not adequately address this 
aspect. 
 
During Mitroff’s “containment/damage limitation” phase, crisis management aims at 
prevent further escalation of the crisis and controlling the damage resulting from it. Since 
organizations usually have limited time to make an intensive crisis management plan for 
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damage control while the crisis is unfolding, having in advance well-prepared plans is 
crucial. The delay component of Sandia is the slowing down of adversary progress and 
can be accomplished by people, barriers, locks, and activated delay mechanisms. There 
are clear links between this component of the security function, Mitroff’s 
“containment/damage limitation” phase and Caplan’s secondary intervention in the PPRR 
model.  
 
Finally, the respond component consists of actions taken by the security personnel to 
interrupt adversary progress and prevent adversary success (Garcia, 2001; 2006). This 
component is again more clearly linked with the secondary intervention (response in the 
PPRR model) although one could also detect links with the tertiary intervention as well as 
with some elements of Mitroff’s “recovery” phase in terms, perhaps, of business 
continuity.  
 
Although the Sandia Methodology has set a good foundation for security systems design, 
it is evident that it does not address several aspects of crisis management as it should. 
Among the criticisms that it received, one is that it is rather reactive and passive. As 
discussed earlier, the terrorists are rational actors who weigh the costs and risks involved 
in attacking a particular target against the group’s objectives and potential benefits of this 
attack. The security function should, therefore, aim also at measures that deter the attack 
by creating a perception of unacceptable risk to those planning an attack. Deterrence can 
be achieved by providing a highly visible security, by increasing security levels in 
response to threats and by making frequent, unpredictable changes in security procedures 
(Morral and Jackson, 2009). Azahari Husin, Jemaah Islamiyah’s alleged mastermind of 
both Bali bombings, noted in a 34-page document retrieved from his computer that the 
operational plan for the second bombing had to be altered because “security was tighter”. 
Indeed, the police in Bali had increased the number of intelligence officers from 70 to 
256, making it too risky for the terrorists to bring in a large amount of explosives and 
more difficult to rent undetected a house with a garage to assemble the bomb (La Guardia, 
2006). Radlauer (2006, p. 609) maintains that deterrence is the ‘holy grail’ of counter-
terrorism, arguing that if enough potential terrorists can be convinced that carrying out 
attacks is a bad idea, all the investment in target-hardening, security checks, and other 
means of countering the terrorism treat will no longer be necessary.   
 
Grosskopf (2004, 2006) presents a slightly different antiterrorism-specific (as opposed to 
a generic security function) model in which he includes all those physical, technological 
and operational measures intended to ‘devalue’, ‘deter’, ‘deny’ and ‘defend’ a potential 
target against acts of terrorism. Considering that the ‘defend’ component corresponds to 
Sandia’s ‘respond’, Grosskopf’s model introduces two new components: devalue and 
deny. He explains that to devalue a potential target is to lessen its significance for 
terrorists. The focus here is not to improve security but to modify the potential target in 
such a way that would result in less gain to the terrorists in the event of an attack.  For 
example, by using CPTED (Crime Prevention Though Environmental Design) techniques 
(Cozens, Saville and Hillier, 2005) to minimize large assemblies of people in certain 
parts of the hotel such as gardens, meeting rooms or lobbies, the attractiveness of these 
areas to a terrorist will be reduced. The deny component refers to the protection of the 
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target by preventing the access of both adversaries and their resources to it. The removal 
or reinforcement of areas where explosive devices could be stored (e.g., garbage bins),  a 
‘stand-off’ distance of more than 100 feet, physical barriers, control points, screening 
policies and layered access to areas may be some of the denial measures that can be 
employed (Coaffee and Bosher, 2008).  
 
Finally, Paraskevas and Arendell (2007) propose a comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy 
framework which includes all the above components but also introduces two additional 
ones: communication and continuity. Their study suggests that the communicate 
component of the strategy should not be confined to marketing and recovery activities but 
include specific notification and awareness practices both internally (among the 
organization’s stakeholders) and externally (media and various target markets). The 
continue component refers to the ability of the organization to protect critical business 
processes and resources in the case of a terrorist attack. The speedy resumption of these 
processes and the safety of staff and customers are central to the security function. With 
these two extra components the security function becomes more compatible with the 
PPRR and Mitroff’s model by incorporating a significant part of the “recovery” phase. 
Title IX of the 9/11 Commission Act, which came later that year, confirmed the 
Paraskevas and Arendell (2007) framework by requiring preparedness in both 
communications and continuity of operations (NCTC, 2007).  
 
The review of this literature, allows a further alignment of the security function with the 
dominant crisis management models as presented in Table 1. The detection of adversary 
activity is in line with Mitroff’s signal detection whereas deterrence is clearly a proactive 
and preventive function (“detect” and “deject” in the refined security function model). 
The delay, devalue and deny components are proactive and aim at the protection of the 
organization and its preparedness for an adversary’s actions (“protect”). The defend 
component is deployed in response to adversary action and aim at its containment and the 
limitation of its impact (“deflect”). The immediate resumption and continuity of mission-
critical business activities as well as the full restoration and recovery of the business, 
requires clear communication processes and full connectivity with all the organization’s 
stakeholders (“connect”). Finally, activities in line with Mitroff’s learning and redesign 
mechanisms (such as ongoing threat/vulnerability analysis, organizational learning from 
adversary activities, security process testing, maintenance and redesign) require a culture 
of continuous reflection and of process review and improvement (“reflect”). 
 
Although the hotel industry is using many, if not all, of the above components of the 
security function to respond to the threat of terrorism, most efforts appear to focus on 
measures that address only specific hotel vulnerabilities.  There have been some attempts 
for the development of industry security standards either in the form of national 
regulation, such as the SS545:2009 Singapore Standard for Hotel Security (SPRING 
Singapore, 2009), or from private sector initiatives (Stelter, 2009). However, there does 
not seem to be a universally accepted ‘baseline anti-terrorism hotel strategy’ that uses 
these security function components to reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack.  
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Table 1 – The Security Function Model  
 
PPRR Model 
(Coppola, 2006; 
Drabek, 1985; Tierney, 
1989) 
Crisis 
Management 
Mechanisms 
(Mitroff, 2005) 
Security Function 
(Danneels, 2000; 
Grosskopff, 2006; 
Morral & Jackson, 
2009; Paraskevas & 
Arendell, 2007) 
Refined Security 
Function 
  
Signal Detection 
 
 
Detect 
 
Detect 
 
Prevention 
 
 
 
Prevention/ 
Preparedness 
 
Deter 
 
Devalue 
Delay 
Deny 
 
Deject 
 
Preparation 
 
 
Protect 
 
Response 
 
 
Containment/ 
Damage Limitation 
 
 
Defend 
 
Deflect 
 
Recovery 
 
 
Recovery 
 
Continue 
Communicate 
 
 
Connect 
  
No-Fault Learning 
 
  
 
Reflect 
  
Redesign 
 
 
 
 
3. Research Design 
 
The study was conducted using the Nominal Group Technique (NGT), a technique that 
helps groups generate ideas and reach consensus through a four-stage structured process: 
problem introduction; individual (silent) idea generation; sharing of ideas in a ‘round-
robin’ fashion; group discussion; voting and ranking (Delbecq, Van de Ven and 
Gustafson, 1986). It is a technique that enables researchers gather information from 
relevant experts and facilitates creative problem solving by means of judgmental decision 
making in situations where there are no guiding examples of research in the literature. 
For the purposes of this study, the judgments of experts were integrated to establish a 
baseline anti-terrorism strategy. 
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Consensus building techniques are often used by hospitality and tourism researchers 
(Paraskevas and Saunders, 2012) and NGT, in particular, has been employed to explore a 
number of issues in the sector. Brown and Giles (1994), for example, used NGT in their 
study of Byron Bay, New South Wales, to assess the residents’ behavioral adaptations to 
periods of peak tourism demand. Olsen (1995) used nominal group sessions with senior 
level hospitality executives focusing on the business environment of the multinational 
hotel industry and the forces driving change in it. Lockyer (2005) applied the technique 
to investigate the factors that influence the selection of hotel accommodation by guests 
whereas, more recently, Clark (2008) used it to formulate marketing strategies for a 
convention centre and Formica and Kothari (2008) to determine the forces that are likely 
to affect the future of tourism in the area of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware 
from 2006 to 2010. Carlsen and Liburd (2008) suggested that one of the research 
techniques to be used in their work aiming to develop a comprehensive research agenda 
for crisis management and market recovery in tourism should be the NGT. 
 
The research sample was purposively selected among thirty-four hotel security 
professionals based in United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Italy, Spain and the 
Netherlands. Although they are all based in Europe, the scope of their companies’ 
business activities is global and include areas with high terrorism threat.  They were 
approached by e-mail and phone and nineteen of them agreed to participate and received 
written information about the aim of the study and the procedure to be followed. Of the 
nineteen participants, thirteen represented nine international hotel groups (one vice 
president of corporate security, one global director of global security, three regional 
directors of security, four group directors of security and four chief security officers), 
three represented international security systems companies and three were international 
security advisors/consultants.  
 
For the first stage of the NGT process (individual idea generation) the participants were 
sent the terrorist attack cycle as presented in this paper and six scenarios of hotel terrorist 
attacks, based on real cases across the spectrum of terrorist groups and modes of 
operation. They were asked to list a set of physical, technical and operational security 
measures (maximum of five in each category) that would potentially avert each attack. 
They were then invited to attend a workshop in London (UK) to share and refine their 
ideas with fellow-professionals. Due to time constraints and various engagements of the 
participants, three such workshops -with 6, 5 and 8 participants- had to be organized 
between December 2008 and November 2009. By the time the workshops were organized, 
the industry experienced the Islamabad Marriott bombing and the Mumbai attacks and, 
therefore, these two scenarios were also taken into consideration. The workshops were 
facilitated by experienced moderators, assisted by the author.  
 
For the second stage of NGT (idea sharing) during the workshops, the participants were 
asked to engage in a round-robin session where they had to discuss and record the 
measures and actions they had put on their lists during the first stage of the study. The 
third stage (group discussion) aimed at ensuring that the meaning and rationale of each 
measure was understood by the group, not to evaluate or judge its merits. Some similar or 
redundant measures were identified and consolidated. Reasons why some others should 
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remain distinct were also suggested. In this stage, the participants were also asked to link 
the proposed measures to particular stages of the two models (six-stage security function 
and terrorist attack cycle). The fourth and final stage of the NGT process (voting and 
ranking) aimed to aggregate the judgments of the participants, in order to determine the 
relative importance of the proposed measures and actions. The process concluded with a 
brief discussion to evaluate the procedure and the outcome.  
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
 
The discussion transcripts and the votes and rankings were analyzed and compared 
qualitatively by security function component and proposed measure/action separately. 
The most voted measures were then consolidated to produce a ‘baseline’ anti-terrorism 
strategy. In order to ensure the reliability of the analysis, the author and the workshop 
moderators performed the same analysis of the results independently by reading, sorting 
and classifying the participants’ proposed measures by each component of the security 
function. The resulting classifications did not show significant differences from each 
other. To further ensure reliability with a test-retest check, the three moderators were 
invited to perform the same task for a second time, four weeks later. The analyses 
resulted in 82% agreement, much higher than the prescribed level of acceptance for 
exploratory research, which is “in the order of 0.6” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, p. 135). 
 
The outcomes of this analysis are presented following the six-step security function 
presented earlier in this paper: 
 
4.1. Detect 
 
In contrast with the Sandia model (Daneels, 2000) which focuses more on adversary 
detection when the attack begins, the participants emphasized terrorist detection from the 
stage of ‘intelligence activities’ throughout the ‘dry-run’ stage of the TAC suggesting a 
series of counter-surveillance actions. The rationale behind this was that in order for an 
attack to be planned, the ‘intelligence unit’ of the terrorist cell will conduct surveillance 
and reconnaissance over long periods of time in order to identify patterns and 
vulnerabilities in security processes,  points of entry (and possibly escape), etc.  Later, at 
the operational planning stage, operatives will conduct reconnaissance to familiarize 
themselves with the hotel and perhaps even ‘dry-runs’ of the attack to test the security 
levels of the property (Drake, 1998; Fussey, 2011). All these activities offer opportunities 
for detection and the participants suggest that essential actions to accomplish this are:   
 
1. A robust, comprehensive suspicious incident reporting (“See something – Say 
something”) and analysis program that involves every employee of the hotel at every 
level. According to a participant “suspicious are all behaviors seemingly normal but 
out of context –such as a guest wearing a raincoat in a sunny day”. Another 
suggested that security officers should be “vigilant for ‘four sames’: same type of 
people, in the same place, at the same time of day, doing the same activity.” 
2. Dedicated, trained in behavioral analysis counter-surveillance team which will be 
able to detect suspicious activities and analyze reported incidents. 
 13 
3. Installation and 24/7 use of video surveillance in the hotel exterior and public areas, 
operated by properly trained console officers (although concerns about budgets to 
support this action were also expressed).  
4. Use of loitering detection software to alert hotel security when individuals remain in 
an area for prolonged times or are perhaps looking to ‘tailgate’ members of staff or 
guests to access/controlled or restricted areas of the hotel.  
 
When it comes to the detection of an actual attack, most participants suggested that 
intrusion detection measures in the hotel’s perimeter would be useful but perhaps 
unrealistic for some hotel security budgets. Silent duress alarms (hidden finger or foot 
switches) were recommended for, mainly, the front office and back-office entrance.  
 
Of particular interest to some participants was the scenario of an attack by grassroots-
operatives (also known as ‘lone wolves’ since they operate on their own). It was argued 
that while such individuals should, in theory, be more difficult to identify through a 
counter-surveillance program, their lack of skills in pre-operational surveillance makes 
them more vulnerable to detection than the better-trained ‘intelligence units’ of organized 
terrorist groups.  
 
4.2. Deject  
 
In short, ‘deject’ is about making all the other measures visible, so that the potential 
attackers perceive the particular property presents unacceptable risks for the group. All 
participants recognize the importance of this component, especially in relation to the 
target selection stage of the attack cycle but also at the later stage of ‘dry-runs’. One 
participant suggested that “the entire baseline anti-terrorism strategy is about deterrence; 
this is the foundation for everything else we do as security professionals”. The 
participants did not propose any deterrent-specific measure but proposed the following 
generic strategies: 
 
1. High visibility of all measures which may lead the potential attackers to conduct 
longer surveillance, deeper reconnaissance and perhaps multiple dry-runs exposing 
themselves more to detection or to remove the hotel from their list of potential targets.  
2. Build in randomness and unpredictability in certain security procedures such as in the 
frequency, timing and routes of security patrols, car checks, metal detector screening, 
luggage checks, etc. 
3. Develop strong relations with local community through a comprehensive and genuine 
social responsibility program. For example, a jihadist group may opt out to attack a 
hotel (or a hotel chain) which has strong ties with the Muslim community and openly 
shows respect to fundamental Muslim beliefs. Such an attack might cause adverse 
effects in the credibility and ideological argumentation of the terrorist group.  
 
Several participants noted that high visibility of security measures can be an issue for 
hotel guests. Indeed, Feickert et al. (2006) in a survey of 930 hotel guests, found that 
although hotel guests generally appreciate the existence of security measures, most guests 
dislike any intrusive security efforts such metal detectors, the obvious presence of an 
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armed guard, and checking guests’ identification against law enforcement records. On the 
other hand, Grosskopf (2006) in two studies of 240 people in a non-hotel environment 
found that the respondents felt 3-6 times less vulnerable to theft, battery and sexual 
assault in areas having a visible security presence, whereas only a minority of 
respondents considered areas with a highly visible security presence to be unfriendly 
(6%), uninviting (12%) or uncomfortable (13%). Perhaps the answer to this issue would 
be a balanced approach, with the visibility of security measures to vary according to the 
risk level of the area where the hotel is located. 
 
4.3. Protect 
 
As discussed earlier, this is the component which attracted most of the proposed 
measures focusing mainly at the physical protection of the hotel. The majority of the 
respondents related this component with the dry-run, asset deployment and attack stages 
of the TAC.  
 
The ‘devalue’ element was quite controversial in terms of measures and actions. A 
significant number of participants strongly argued that the devaluation of a hotel as a 
target should not be part of a baseline anti-terrorist strategy and should only be activated 
in higher threat conditions. Nevertheless, the participants proposed the following actions: 
        
1. Layered blast protection system with blast film on windows as a priority (reinforced 
external concrete walls in the perimeter as a second step). 
2. Review of publically available information on the hotel (especially the Internet) and 
removal of anything that could be used by potential attackers (although everyone 
admitted that GoogleEarth cannot be removed). 
3. At elevated threat conditions removal or covering of company’s logos from external 
display and abandon flag policy (especially flags of nations labeled as ‘enemies’ by 
the potential attackers). 
 
Measures related with the ‘deny’ and ‘delay’ elements referred mainly to control of 
movement in the perimeter and the interior of the property: 
  
1. Perimeter access control measures (barriers and bollards, maximum possible stand-off 
distance) including CPTED (e.g., large pots, cement stanchions) for controlled flow 
of pedestrians and vehicles towards the hotel.  
2. Develop in collaboration with local law enforcement a vehicular parking plan 
providing adequate stand-off (at least 30 meters) next to and around the hotel as well 
as a control policy for vehicles approaching the premises or intended for the hotel’s 
parking space, including undercarriage and the cab.    
3. Design access control program with public, semi-public (not accessible to the general 
public without an escort, e.g., sales and marketing or banquets and conferencing 
offices), controlled (e.g., elevators requiring specific keys, parking lots) and restricted 
areas (e.g., HVAC rooms, HAZMAT/chemicals’ storeroom, electrical, boiler and 
pump rooms). The program should also specify access control points in these areas 
and access credential procedures (e.g., swipe cards, badges, etc.).  
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4. In collaboration with local fire authorities installation and use of deployable barriers 
such as motorized operable walls, roll down grilles or deployable doors to contain 
movement of attackers as part of the hotel’s ‘active shooter’ program.  
5. Availability of weapon and explosive detectors (including sniffer dogs), millimeter 
wave scanners (for whole body imaging) and X-ray machines for elevated threat 
conditions.  
 
Under this label, and as part of the ‘deny’ element, some participants brought up also the 
issue of employee vetting. The discussion on this topic was triggered by the fact that one 
of the perpetrators in the 2009 JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton bombings in Jakarta 
(Ibrohim) was the florist for both hotels and that two more suspects arrested in the 
aftermath of the attack were also hotel employees (Amir Abdilah, was a former employee 
in the five-star Hotel Mulia and Yayan was a cook in the Grand Melia Hotel). While the 
difficulties of employee vetting were acknowledged in this discussion, it was agreed that 
it should be placed higher in the agenda of hotel security and human resources, especially 
for properties located in ‘high risk’ areas.    
 
4.4. Deflect 
 
This component is exclusively related with the attack stage. Although in some ‘high risk’ 
areas hotels employ armed security officers, the participants agreed that a baseline anti-
terrorist strategy should not involve direct engagement of security or other personnel with 
the attackers. For this reason they suggested that the ‘defend’ element should be 
combined with the ‘continue’ and aim primarily at the protection of employee and guest 
lives and secondarily at the continuity of mission critical business processes. The 
measures and actions proposed under this component were:  
 
1. Train security personnel on appropriate and acceptable response in the event of a 
terrorist attack using a number of scenarios (VBIED attack, suicide bomber attack, 
active shooter attack, etc.). Hotel’s first responders should be trained in first aid, CPR 
and use of defibrillator.  
2. Test effectiveness of evacuation planning and related signage and ensure that 
evacuation routes and assembly points are secure from potential adversary action. 
Establish policy by which current lists of employees and guests are stored in a central 
repository on a daily basis. Determine alternate accommodation arrangements for 
evacuees and establish liaison persons with local hospitals for the potentially injured. 
3. Develop a “shelter-in-place” program for cases where evacuation is not possible, with 
meals ready to eat and drinking water, defibrillators and first aid kits.  
4. Detailed property architectural plans should be kept up-to-date and shared with local 
authorities. Conduct joint drills and exercises on various terrorist attack scenarios 
with local ‘blue light’ services.  
5. Identify business critical functions and develop continuity plans including 
contingencies for potential loss of critical utility services, with specified and 
appropriately trained plan owners.  
6. Maintain a properly equipped ‘cold’ site to be used by the crisis management team as 
a command centre in emergency situations. 
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The issue of a possible RDD (radiological dispersal device) attack was also discussed in 
two of the three workshops as a result of the Litvinenko poisoning with polonium-210 at 
the Millennium Hotel, Grosvenor Square, in 2006. However, the eventuality of such an 
attack in a hotel was largely dismissed by the participants as it was noted that it would 
not have the massive impact that a terrorist group would desire. It was also argued that 
the materials required for a RDD are quite expensive to obtain and difficult to handle. 
One participant also noted that “an RDD attack would be far more effective in places of 
large population concentration, such as a subway station not a hotel – remember the 
1995 sarin gas attack in Tokyo by Aum Shinrikyo members?” Participants therefore 
agreed that such eventuality should not be considered in a baseline hotel anti-terrorist 
strategy.  
 
4.5 Connect 
 
The ‘connect’ component has to do with the creation and maintenance of all those 
networks, both internal and external to the hotel, necessary for an effective security 
function. These networks are facilitating the flow of security-related information at all 
stages of the TAC. Internal communication networks transfer information generated by 
the property’s surveillance and counter-surveillance processes thus enabling detection of 
terrorist operatives, notification about possible intrusion and infiltration of the property, 
emergency communication during an attack, etc.  
 
1. Develop and keep up-to-date an emergency notification network (call tree) for the 
crisis management team, other key contact personnel, internal first responders and 
local emergency response teams.  Test regularly emergency communication 
procedures and protocols.  
2. Create contingency communication networks (satellite phones, pagers) for the event 
that primary communication channels (landline and mobile telephony, e-mail) 
become inoperable.   
3. Assign responsibility for internal crisis communications to a dedicated person or team 
and generate ‘canned’ messages to be disseminated to the workforce at various levels 
of threat. 
4. Provide effective and efficient connectivity for surveillance team and other personnel 
for suspicious incident reporting. 
 
External communication networks refer to connections with the various hotel 
stakeholders such as guests, corporate accounts, suppliers, media, local and international 
community and sources of intelligence.  As with internal communication, the 
responsibility for external communication should be assigned to a dedicated 
spokesperson or team. Different stakeholders will have different information needs. The 
workshop participants distinguished three types of external communication networks: 
marketing communication networks, social networks and intelligence networks. 
 
Marketing communication networks are the networks used to restore the organization’s 
public and market image and recover business back to normalcy after a crisis situation. 
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Normally these networks are created and maintained by the senior management team, the 
marketing team and the company’s public relations professionals. 
 
Social networks are those developed between the organization and members and leaders 
(political and religious) of the local community as part of its social responsibility 
program. Depending on the strength of connectivity between the various nodes in these 
networks, they can also provide important counter-surveillance information back to the 
hotel. As discussed earlier, a strong relationship with the local community may act as an 
ideological deterrent on a potential terrorist attack.       
 
Intelligence networks are purposefully developed for the collection of information on 
possible terrorist activity and determination of threat condition levels. Usually these are 
networks with local law enforcement, intelligence agencies and embassies. However, 
valuable information can be also collected by the media, and business intelligence 
providers. The latter can be private (contracted) sources (e.g., Control Risks Group, Hill 
and Associates, I-Jet Travel Risk Management, Jane’s Information Group, Transecur) or 
private-public partnerships such as the  Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) in 
the US, the Dutch Counterterrorism Alert System and the under development Italian 
Observatory on National Security Matters.  
 
4.6. Reflect  
 
The final building bloc of the baseline anti-terrorism strategy is the organization’s and its 
security professionals’ attitude towards continuous learning, self-evaluation and self-
renewal. The participants showed remarkable consensus in this aspect as they almost 
unanimously agreed that the security function is dynamic and should continuously 
change. The actions and measures proposed for this last building block are as follows: 
 
1. Reflect on why the particular property can be targeted by a terrorist group 
(symbolism, clientele, etc.). Consistently conduct vulnerability analysis to identify 
possible weaknesses that adversaries can exploit in order to successfully attack the 
property. Test and evaluate counter-surveillance effectiveness, possible ways of 
infiltration and exfiltration, effectiveness of protective physical, technological and 
operational counter-measures.  
2. Develop an organization-wide security awareness culture where everyone is engaged 
in the protection and welfare of guests and workforce. 
3. Create a security knowledge repository where new learning on terrorist activities, 
modes of operation and tactics as well as industry lessons from both failures and best 
practice will be stored.   
4. New knowledge should be used for continuous review and updating of the hotel’s 
security processes and measures as well as for training the people involved with the 
security function. 
5. Anticipate possible adversary strategic, operational and tactical changes the 
property’s current security practices may trigger and prepare countermeasures for 
these changes.  
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In the plenary sessions at the end of the three NGT workshops it became apparent that, 
although the identified six components of the security function can be used as the 
building blocks of a hotel’s anti-terrorism strategy, the core of this strategy and the aim of 
every hotel security professional should be the disruption of one or more stages of the 
TAC. As noted by one participant “…by the law of compounding probabilities, 
decreasing the chance of successfully completing one or more of these stages will 
exponentially decrease the chance of completing the entire attack cycle.” Therefore, the 
anti-terrorism strategy should always be viewed as inextricably linked with the TAC (Fig. 
2). 
    
Fig. 2 - A Six-Step Model for Anti-Terrorism Strategy in Hotels 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The aim of this study was to develop and propose a baseline anti-terrorism strategy for 
hotels. Drawing from the generic crisis management literature (Drabek, 1985; Mitroff, 
2005) the study showed that there is a need to expand the understanding of the security 
function from its classic approach of ‘detect-deny-respond’ (Garcia, 2001) to a model 
with six building blocks that can become the framework for the development of the 
strategy in question. Using this framework as a basis, a nominal group of nineteen hotel 
security professionals identified a series of measures and actions that can formulate a 
hotel’s baseline anti-terrorism strategy with two dimensions: threat-based physical 
protection of employees, guests and hotel’s critical assets (protect – deflect); and 
intelligence-led security tactics (detect – deject – connect – reflect). This new proposed 
two-dimensional approach differs from the current security practice because it 
emphasizes the role of the security function both before and in the aftermath of a terrorist 
attack and shifts the focus of the strategy from the passive protection of the target to the 
active disruption of the terrorist attack cycle (TAC). Although this general approach to 
anti-terrorism strategy is consistent with the generic models of crisis management, the 
study revealed two additional elements that are vital for the success of the strategy: the 
role of external networks in detection and recovery; and the need for security 
professionals to engage in a continuous ‘mind-game’ with potential adversaries and 
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implement dynamic anti-terrorism policies and practices which are constantly reviewed 
and updated, so that they are always ‘one step ahead’ of them. These two elements add a 
dimension of dynamism to the extant crisis management models which are often 
criticized as dominated by ‘static’ crisis management plans, normally developed and 
executed by ‘authorized’ members of the organization without the participation or 
involvement of external stakeholders (Robert and Lajtha, 2002; Takeda and Helms, 2006). 
 
From a practitioner’s perspective, the implementation of a baseline anti-terrorism strategy 
will be influenced predominantly by the size and the budget of hotels. International hotel 
groups with multiple brands in their portfolio may opt to protect the higher end of their 
provision rather than the lower one. However, it should be noted that the terrorist threat is 
not lower for non-western-flagged, locally-owned hotels with lower profiles (3-star hotels) 
or guest houses. The 2010 attacks on the Park Residence and Hamid guesthouses in the 
heart of the most secure areas in Kabul debunked these arguments. Therefore, even 
smaller hotels will need to deploy some elements of this strategy allocating budgets based 
on the ‘threat-based and intelligence led’ principle.  
 
Of course, this study has methodological limitations that need to be taken into 
consideration when evaluating the findings. The first limitation concerns the format of 
the NGT, which although quite structured and prescriptive, does not always allow the 
participants to put forward the reasons for their judgments and opinions. Also, some 
aspects of the process (such as the composition of the group or the procedure for 
aggregating votes and ranking) may influence the outcome to varying directions. A 
second area of concern is the way that the participants’ professional backgrounds (e.g., 
police vs. military; operations vs. intelligence; loss prevention vs. risk management) and 
organizational cultures affect their views. The final concern is reliability, particularly as 
far as nominal groups are concerned. The strength of the NGT is that it provides a 
platform for in-depth discussion; however, this can also be its weakness since it can lead 
to non-representative and therefore unreliable, judgments.  
 
It would therefore be interesting for future researchers to test these findings not only with 
a larger and more representative sample of hotel security professionals but also test these 
findings with hotel owners and operators, general managers, and law enforcement agents. 
Several other streams of research may be followed, building on the findings of this study 
in areas that hospitality and tourism scholars have identified as needing more in-depth 
exploration. In the context of the ‘deject’ stage of this study, for example, researchers 
could explore the extent to which the “labeling and framing” of specific anti-terrorism 
measures and strategies cause a positive or a negative effect on the guests’ experience of 
the hotel. Ritchie, Tung and Ritchie (2011), for example, in their study of tourist 
experiences argue that most research focuses on the ‘facts’ of what happens rather than 
the interpretation that travelers are giving to those ‘facts’. In the case of heightened 
security measures and policies, it would be interesting to explore hotel guests’ 
interpretations of these measures and to identify ways to encourage guests to make sense 
of them with implications to branding, signage, promotional messaging, etc. Further, 
Harrington and Ottenbacher (2011), in their review of hospitality research on strategy and 
uncertainty suggest that studies should look at how strategic relationships between 
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hospitality and non-hospitality firms can be used to minimize uncertainty, a research 
question which could be contextualized within the ‘connect’ stage of this study, on the 
ways of creating and effectively operating internal and external intelligence and social 
and marketing communication networks for hotel security purposes.  
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